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State v. Williams, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 52, 93 P.3d 1258 (Nev. 2004)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – HABEAS CORPUS 
Summary 
Following her conviction for six counts of driving with prohibited substance in 
blood or urine, one count of use of controlled substance, and one count of possession of 
controlled substance, petitioner sought writ of habeas corpus.2 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada (“the court”) held that: 1) the petitioner did not 
establish good cause for failing to raise her claim that marijuana metabolite was not a 
prohibited substance at trial or on direct appeal, and was thus procedurally barred, and 2) 
that marijuana metabolite is prohibited substance.3 
 
Factual & Procedural History 
 A grand jury indicted Jessica Williams on six counts of driving and/or being in 
actual control of a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, reckless 
driving, and involuntary manslaughter.4  She was indicted on one count of being under 
the influence of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  
 Williams was found guilty for six counts of driving a vehicle with a prohibited 
substance in her blood or urine, one count for each of the six deaths she caused.  She was 
also convicted of unlawfully using a controlled substance and possession of a controlled 
substance, but was acquitted of the remaining charges. 
 On direct appeal, Williams raised several contentions, but the court finding no 
errors, affirmed the convictions.5 
 Williams then filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
district court, alleging that the prohibited substance found in her blood was marijuana 
metabolite (carboxylic acid) is not prohibited under N.R.S 484.125. 6  She argued that 
since carboxylic acid was not specifically listed as a prohibited substance under schedule 
I or II, her conviction was unconstitutional on the ground that one of theories presented to 
the jury was false.7 
 The State argued that Williams’ petition was procedurally barred, and that even if 
the petition was properly before the court, it should be denied because marijuana 
metabolite is specifically prohibited by N.R.S. 484.1245 and 484.379. 
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 The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and agreed with Williams, 
granting her petition.8 The district court then ordered that Williams’ conviction for 
driving a vehicle with a prohibited substance in the blood or urine to be reversed.  The 
State then filed an appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 The State argued that Williams’ petition was procedurally barred by N.R.S. 
34.810, and that her claim that marijuana metabolite was not a prohibited substance was a 
new claim that she should have raised at trial or on direct appeal.9  N.R.S. 34.810 creates 
a procedural bar for new post-conviction claims that could have been raised earlier. 
 In Williams’ case, the court found that 1) her claim about marijuana metabolite 
was new, and should have been raised previously, and 2) absent a showing of cause or 
prejudice, her claim was procedurally barred. 
 The court went on to explain that to establish good cause for failure to raise a 
claim in an earlier proceeding, the petitioner must demonstrate “that an impediment 
external to the defense prevented her from raising her claims earlier.10 
 The court found that there was no merit to Williams’ argument of good cause, 
(specifically, that she didn’t raise the claim earlier because of the highly complex, and 
scientific nature of her claim) and that she failed to establish prejudice to overcome the 
bar of N.R.S. 34.810.  Despite her claim to the contrary, N.R.S. 484.379 and 484.1245, 
both list marijuana metabolite as prohibited substances, and as such, the Legislature 
intended incorporation by reference under 484.3795(1)(f).11   
Though the court admitted there could be confusion as to a partial statutory 
ambiguity, this claim did not rise to the level of creating actual prejudice, and as such, did 
not consider her claim that there existed a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”12     
 
Conclusion 
 The court concluded that Williams failed to show good cause and actual prejudice 
to pass the procedural bar of her post-conviction habeas petition.  Thus, the court 
reversed the district court’s determination in granting Williams’ conviction petition for a 
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